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This paper attempts to de al with tn~ ·dev~lo pment of the law
 in 
New Zealand governing the control by one or a few pe
r sons of t he 
trade in some commodity or service. It--deo..Ls wi-th-mo-
r!opo~y-and 
o li.gop-o~. 
In troducti.Q.!1 
It seems to be gen~t~~J,t~,1%_ccepted by most people tha
t monopoly 
is per se evil or 
1p~us. Conventional econor.1ists argue that 
monopoly is evil for the control of t he trade allows
 a person 
both to exploit the market and to use econonic resou
rces ( e.gc 
labour materi~ls etc.) in an uneconomi c ¼ay. Free co
mpe tition 
between a number of people whose freedor1 to act is u
ni.t~d , 
by contract (or some similar r estraint) it is said p
reve~ts lv,h?t •vt"~-l\ec-/ 
wastage of resources and e:xploi t ati.on. Compe tition 
brings 
furthermore the test exploitation of scarce resource
so 
It is not t he pur po se of t t is paper to discuss the a
dvantages 
or disadvantages of monopoly nor is it within the com
p e tence of 
the writer. However it can be asser ted with some fo
rce that the 
facts of any particular situation may justify monop
olistic 
practices. For an examp le the writer would argue t h
a t some 
cogent reasons exist for the conference system for l
iner trades, 
one bein g the ability of the shipper to guarantee t h
at his goods 
will be carried where he wants. Opponents of the sy
steri1 believe 
that shipowners exploit a captive market. 
The facts not only of the monopoly, but of the elast
icity of t h e 
demand for goods or services, the surrounding market
 condi tions, 
goverr..r:ient control, arbitrary capricious and ever~ c
har.ging 
consumer demand are all vital in determining whether
 monopoly 
serves or fails to serve the best interests of the 
1 consUL'ier 1 
public. 
The f act that monopoly may enable a person to exploi
t a market 
and cha r ge unjustifiably hi gh prices was r e cognised 
by t he law at 
least as early as 1602 C.Q .. ~rcy v. Allein /J..602/ 11 Co Rep 8
46). 
P<'" •' ""'' C \C~C( 
The reco gnition of monopoly as potentially puniti~us 
a t that time 
can it is sug gested be linked with the gener al prohi
bition of usery 
d..- by perhaps a be.g":e. r ccogni tion of t he helplessnes s 
of many per-sons 
in the face of superior economic power. 
Although t he dange rs of monopoly were reco gnised by 
t he co m~on l aw 
from such early times until now, t .r_e nineteenth cent
ury sa\·./ the 
growth of ano ther co:-1r:1on law doc trine t hat even nou 
aooears t o be 
sacro sanc t (~Ui..§_§e ;~~lantigu~: case )o The freedom to 
contract 
without fear of int2rfere;,nce fro::.1 any state organ i s t
te doctrine 
that once r ecognised overpowered the comnon l aw's ea
rlier 
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recognition of the dangers of monopoly. It would be fair to say 
that once entr enched i n the l aw· the cor.unon law doctrine of fr eedom 
to contrac t effectively prohibited any developoent of co m::.1on l aw 
rules restraining monopoly. 
Common Law Principles 
There are three grounds at common law for interfering with.a 
contract which is entered into or incorporates restraint.i-:J:e\ trz.de . 
The law will interfere if the contract is unreasonable, if t he 
means used to obtain the re st rainti:Y~ trade ar e unlawful, if the 
result of t he agreement to restrain trade is unlawful,~ 
1m r:e ~.soldabl eoe-s-s o 
The leading authority is No r denfelt v. Maxim Norde:i.felt /1894/ 
535 where Lord MacNaughton said that 1 where covenants aR-0- P---
restraint~ t rade we r e re asonable with re spe ct to the parties 
and with re~ard to the interests of the publi c the law would 
enforce such a covenant. 1 
Since that time the Courts found that a combination by shipowne rs 
to prevent another shipowner preserving or enla rging his share 
of the market was re asonable in the interests of the parties to the 
combir.ation and wa s not otherwise unlawfulo Mogul Steamshio v. 
McGregor Gow /1892/ A.C. 25. 
An agre ement between all con.lfield ooera tors and some shi oovme rs 
in South .<1US tralia for a s hi Downer to t ake all the coal on a ClUO ta 
system was reco gnised a s l a1.·1ful at comr:1on l aw• (At to rJl_eY Gener-1.l 
for South Aus tralia v. Adelaide Steamship Co. & Otl e rs 71913/ 
A.C. 781), Notwithstanding t he evidence that the comp lete control 
of the ::na rket thereby given caused the market price of coal t o rise 
by nearly forty percento The combination of ure Unioruto 
effectively pr even t a rival manufacturer from marketing his products 
was not unreasonable in the interests of the public o Crofter 
Hlndwoven Ha!\,ff~ Tweed v. Veitch and Others /1942/ A.C. 4320 
Unre a sonable restraints have included t he tying for life of all 
farmers in a substantial area to the one dairy factory. 
McEllistrim v. 3all ~acelli gott Co-o Agricultural and Dairv 
SocietyrJ.!ilit ed 1919 ,i.C. 548 . It was held, notwithst:J.nciin6 the 
evidence of the parish priest that t he f a rmers we re unreasonable 
and likely to give way to the temp tation of compe titive pric e s? 
that the covenant was not r easonable betwe en t he parties for it 
scarcely protected the f a r mer and was not in the interests of the 
public. Accordingly t he covenant to restrain the trade would not 
be enforced by the Courto 
A rather unusual case c oncerns an elderly gentleman who wa s paid 
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a pension upon th e condition that he did not enter the wool trade 
in competiti on with his forme r emoloyers. Be cause the restrai nt 
was wider t han necessary to protect the man Qnd because it was teld 
that such restrain t was not in the public interes t the contract to 
pay the pension was not enfor~ble. Wyatt v. Kreglinger and 
Fernau /1933/ 1 K.B. 7930 
A contract was held contrary~ the interests of the public and 
thus u...rienforcible whe re tube manufacturers provided by agp; ement 
between them that each manufacturer would make and sell a 
prescribed part of the to tal demandi. The agreement provided for 
compensation of that manufacturer who took less than his 
prescribed share of the marke t and penalised the manufacturer who 
took more. The Courts easily reco gnised the ability of the 
inefficient to hide behind the agree~ent. Joseoh Evans v. 
Heathcote and Others /1918/ 1 K.B. 418 
The earlier cases demonstrate a number of basic principles. 
They include a reluctance to reco gnis e the public interest except 
in extreme cases and exc~t upon proof of the damage suffered by 
the public (see in particular Adela ide Steamshio Co. supra)o 
The restraint clauses conc erning unlimited areas or concerning 
unlimited periods of time were also held t o be m1enforc1~ble. 
No real thought was ever given to the relative bargaining strength 
of the parties. However the agreements were lawful but 
unenforc<i.\ble if the restr aint clause was unre asonable. 
More recently the Courts have considered the relative bargaining 
power of the parties. Robinson v. Golden Chins 1971 N. Z.L.R. 
257, Texa co v. Mulberrv Fillinq Station 1972 l All E.R. 513. 
Public interest tests in Pharmaceutical Society of Great Brit J.iQ 
v. Dixon /1968/2 All E.R. 686 was said to beAconsideration of all 
the circw~st 3nces against the principle tha t free and competitive 
trading was in the publi c interest. This contrasts strangely 
with Adelaide Steamshi~ Co.'s case (supra) where t he dramatic . 
increase in price to the n_ublic as a result of the re s trainti~a 
t,L,J.-~ 
~'+~ trade was notedAwhere strong and co gent proof was required of the 
damage to the public interest. Thus it would a ) pear that monopoly 
now needs to be justified rather thanAthe interference of the 
freedom of contracto ""°~le\ 
The Courts now seem more ready to find that covenants and 
restraint~ trade are unreasonableo In one sense the leading 
case is the Privy Council decision in Vanc ouve r Malt and Sfr:!::tt;y"'.'x(ke 
Brewing Co:::ina.n2 Lir.ii ted v. 'Jancouver Bre'.1~rics /193t;/ ;. .• c. 181., 
There the Court rigorously exa~ined the adoqu~cy of the consider~tion 
flowing from the restrained partyo TheiiT covenant in restraint 
seemed to be bciacly supportable. The Courts in the recent cases 
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of Petrofipa (Gr ea t §ritain) Limited v. l~rtiq /1966/ 1 All E.R. 
126 and Esso Petroleum v. da r ner ' s Gar a~e (StourJor t) Li~ited 
/1967/ 1 All B. R. 699 have insi s t ed t ha t t he true t e st i s whe ther 
the protection sought by the pa rty seekin g to enforce the 
restraint is reasonable in all t he circtunstanceso Prior to these 
cases (e.g. ~Jordenf elt (supra) ) time and area a ppeared to be the 
sole considera t .Lons and a pparently were decided by rule of thumb 
rather than any real consideration of the circumstanceso 
The Courts therefore seem now less concerned with the doctrine 
of freedom of contract and more concerned with both prevention of 
monopoly and protection of the individual. Nevertheless the 
limitations placed on the common law involvement in restrictive 
trade practices is seriously curtailed by the pronounceme~t in 
Nord?nfelt (supra)o Recent cases merely add useful but by no 
means po~erful glosses on the original ruleo 
The second major weakness of the common law rule has been the 
remedies it offers a person who has suffered loss through a contract 
in res traintU,f" trade. Com:non law will do no more provided the 
means employed have been lawful than declare the contract 
unenfor~-ble o Thus Lord Reid in Esso PetroleUIQ (supra) said at 
707 1one must bear in mind that a::i. agre ement in restrainL~ ~( 
trade is generally lawful if the parties agree to abide by it: 
it is only unenforcible if the parties choose not to abide by it 1 • 
Unlawful HeaikS 
Clearly where unlawful means (i.e. force) are used to enforce 
a restraint§ve trade the Courts will hold the restraint unlawfulo 
It may well also award damages to the Plaintiff in such a case. 
(Daily Mirror ~fowsp ap_ers v. Gardiner /1968/ 2 All E. R. 163). 
Since certain 
there seems a 
party to seex 
restraints of 
32 N.Z.L.R. 1 
N.Z.L.R. 5530 
practices are now rendered unlawful by Sta tute 
possibility that the injured (a lthough not the public) 
C • ' ,.\ ')<r\-
r ed re s s through the. Courts 1\I or :nerly lawful 
tradeo Fairba irn ',.fr~li,. &: Co . v. Levin & Co. /1915/ 
and Caues v. Frui t Distri but ors Li~ited /1954/ 
CQnl:non law 3Present Position 
It has been repeated several times above that common law would not 
enforce unreasonable r e straints of trade, provided t he restr i int 
was achieved by l awful means. It would otherwise impose no 
rest r iction upon persons seeking to combine in some restrictive 
trade practice. Accordingly only the le gislature could successful ly 
-· ~ 
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act to restrain the development of monopolistic practices. Until 
1958 it appears that New Zea land's Trades Practices Le gi slation 
was virtually without teeth. · 
Legislative Develooments to 1958 .._ _ 
Prevention of lfono..QQ_l..Y_i~ct 1908 This Act provides , in resuect 
of agricultural implements, flour, wheat and pota to~,.''the Governor 
General may lift the customs duty on those cor.unodities if it 
becomes apparent that a cartel is dealing with the abovementioned 
products. 
Trade UniQns AcU-908 - This Act is important only because it 
rendered unenforc4ble agreements between trade union members o 
Trade unions for the purposes of ti1e ,\et included not only 
combinations of labour but combinations of supplierso Accordingly 
in Q.o)j.finch v. R1:1;atikL s ~1· .. 1:-1ill2rs I Co-cm ,\5i.sn Ltd (1·313) 33 
N.Z.L.R. 666 a co~bination by saw~illers was incorporated under the 
Co moanies Act (the Trade Unions Act nrohibited the incor ooration 
of unions under that Act) could not ~nforce the agreements it had 
with its members. In fact in that case a member sought to enforce 
the quota system with the conpanyo 
Commercial Trusts Act 1910 -~ P.·-.:::..a ...... 't:{c.- to this Act provided 
that it was for I the re:Jre ssion of monoool ie s in trade and com;.1.erce 1 • 
The Act initially applied to a restrict~~ nwnber of basic foodstuffs 
(extended in 1915) and fuels o It nrovided for the criminal 
prosecution of monopolistic practiceso 0 -'t~'l' trusts were defined 
to include combinations of persons who had as their object either 
•controlling, determining or influencing supply, demand or price 
of any goods in New Zealand or any part thereof ••••• creating or 
maintaining in New Zealand or any p~rt thereof a monopoly in the 
supply or demand of any goods 1 o Section 3 of the Act noteu 
a series of offences relating to the giving of illegal concessions 
in consideration of exclusive dealingso The offences included 
(a) dealing exclusively with any person in relation to 
particular g~ods or in general ; 
(b) to not dealing with a specified person or class of 
person in relation to particular goods or in general; 
(c) giving of an illegal concession for a refusal to deal 
with specified persons or class of persons in 
relation to particular goods or in general; 
(d) restricti ons in dealing with particular persons ; 
(e) concessions given for becoming a member of a 
commercial trust; 
(f) for concessions given to a person for acting in 
accordance with the directions of the coJLrne rcial 
trusto 
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Section 4 created a series of offences relating to the illegal 
refusal by persons, particularly commercial trusts, to deal with 
other persons. 
Section 5 made it an offence for a person to conspire to monopolise 
wholly or partly the de~and or supply in New Zealanq_of any zoo ds 
or ,.control the de:nand or supply or price of goods "tftfd!vwould be guilty 
of ~ offence11 if t he monopoly or control was contrar to the public 
inter e s to 
I 
c·,, ~ a. p ~/\ ... ~ 
Section 6 nrovided that it was an offence if a person charged an 
unreasonabiy high price at the direction of any commercial trust . 
Section 7 provided t ha t all members of the comnercial trust would be 
guilty of an offence if the commercial trust sold goods at an 
unreasonably high price. 
Section 8 provided a definition of unreasonably high prices by 
providing that persons were to get ~air and reasonable' rates of 
cor.une rcial profito 
The fi t prosecution concerned the control by the Colonial -. 
Sugar Co, any of virtually the whole sugar trade in New Zealand . 
Basicallyt ' e company distributed suga r through a large numbe r of 
wholesalers ~o obtained differing rebates o~ prices cha rgecl in 
accordance wit· the amount of sugar they purchased. One wholesaler 
passed virtually the whole of its rebates onto its retailers ( 
it also imported - me sugar in compe tition with the Sugar Company) 
contrary to the prac+ice of the others who eventually combin,~d to 
form the New Zealand } rchants Association (actually a combination 
of regional merchants a ociations). The 1erchants Association 
prevailed upon the Sugar 1 pany to give it rebates based onti~much 
larger quantity of sugar it s t hen able ~p take which enabled it 
to pass a greater rebate o!1 to · ts retailer s":'i}airbairn ~vri gh t ( the 
reluctant whol2salerp,;(Mf"-quan1.. · ty reoate had been much reduced) 
~ couldo Fairbairn Wright co::1. se. ently lost some of its retailers 
-t"6 the ·1e rchants Association and W:)U d eventually have lost its 
whole trade in sugar but for the succ sful prosecution of the 
Merchants .Association and the participa:i in the scheJie. The 
prosecuti~? against the Me rchants Associa ·on succeeded under 
Section 3~ of the Commercial Trusts Act 191 which provided that 
an offence was co mmitted where a concession wa given to a person 
who undertook to become a member of a comne rcia trust. It was 
held that the Mer chants Association was a comme rci 1 trust and the 
rebJ.te was given to its r:iembers upon the conditlon that they entered 
that trusto 
As a follow up Fairbairn Wright sued the distributor chosen by the 
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Merchants Association to purchase the sugar from the Sugar Co~pany, 
Levin & Co. and it was held that Fairbairn Wright had a aaod cause 
of acti0n against Levin & Co. because Levin & Co. and the others 
had used unlawful means to achieve a restraint in trade. The Court 
held that there was no cause of action under the Act. (Fairbairn 
Wright 1 C~. v. Levin & Co. /1915/ 32 N. Z.L. R. 1) 
In the early 1920's price control was removed from flour and the 
millers in ew Zealand after a diffic~lt season de cided to imoose 
their own system of ensurins the stability of the industry. · 
Basically a company was formed tlrn:l distributett virt1.:ally all t he 
flour produced in New Zealand . It set prices and ensured that the 
millers got a return based essent i ally on a quo t a form of 
distribution. Return was not based on either quality or in fact the 
amount produced by each individual miller . Prosecuti on was brou 0 ht 
under Section 3 of the Con~e rcial Trusts Act 1910 and 
under SectLm 5o At first i nsti:1nce the orosecution w:is dismissed 
but the Court of Appeal al lowed the Crow~'s appeal by a majority of 
three t o two. The Privy Council allowed the milling company 's 
appeal eventually. This is reported in the Supreme Court in .~ 
/1925/ N" . Z. L. R. 258 and t te Court of Appeal in the same volume 752 
and the Privy Council in 1927 A.G. at 394. 
With re spect to Section 3 of the Act the Privy Council s oid merely 
that t he distributing conpany was the agent for t he millers and 
therefore could not gi ve the millers a concess ion in exchange for 
the exclusive dealing . In one swoop the refore Section 3 was 
completely emasculatedo 
Secti on 5 deals as is sa id above with the creation of monopoly 
against public interest. The Privy Council said tha t monopoly 
was not necessarily rendered illegal by this Statute and ttat the 
public inter es t was a matter of f act and not of law (i.e. they 
were not prepared to hold t hat the absence of conoetition w3s bad) 
and that there were no facts proved to establish ihat the monopoly 
wa s not in public interest (once again evidence had been led 
showing a subs t 3ntial increase in pri ce and uneven quality as a 
result of the for mation of the distributing company). As a result 
of the Privy Council' s decision no prosecution could ce brought 
under Section 3 because to r estrain coopetition a combination 
mer ely formed a company to act as it s agen t. 
Fresh tropical fruits until 1950 were imported into New Zealand by 
the Government but in ttat year the Government grant ed a aonopoly 
to Fruit Distributors Limited (~ company formed for ttat purpose ) 
for the importing of all fruito In 19bl bananas were in short 
supply and the old quota system previou 0 ly operated by the 
Gover :nr.1Gnt tended to favour old e s t2 blished communities r ather than 
,.. . 
G p 
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fresh developments. The comp any accordingly altered the quotQ 
system (in consultation with retailers) based on a pe riod of ti~e 
during which bananas had been in go od supply, which period of time 
had occurr ed so~e ver y short time previously. The Plaintiff, 
one Capes, had apparently purchased bananas from other t han his 
usual supplier dur ing the prescribed period and consequently his 
quota was much reducedo Capes therefore endeavoured first to 
establish that there had been a breach of Section 4 of the 
Co mme rcial Trusts Act 1910 (i.e. an il lega l refusal to deal) 
and sued for the loss of profito The Courts held essentially 
tha t the system that had be en devised was the most equitable in view 
of the shortage of bananas and that Capes had received his f air share 
of bananas. (Incidentially imported fruit is still so distri buted ). 
The Act could have been imoortant because it created offences for 
certs in mono oolistic uracti ceso However once the Crown milli~g ca ~e 
(supra) h2d been decided it was easy to~onetrous provisions of the 
Acto In any event the Act had always had extremely limited 
oper ~tion. It is still in force. 
Board of Trade Act 1919 - This Act provided first for the creation 
of two offences. It also gave power to the Minister to pass 
regulations to combat monopoly in 'tt e industry 1 o 
Section 32 (3) of the Act created an offence of 'hoarding for the 
purpose of pushing prices of goods up 1 o 
Section 32 (1) provided that it was an offence to sell goods for 
unreQsonable profito In one case under Section 32 (1) the overseas 
manufacturers of the Big Ben alarm clocks continually obtained large 
increases in the f.o.b. price of the goods. Accordingly the 
distributors in New lealand lifted the prices of Big Ben alarm clocks 
as each increase in the f.o.b. price became knowno This meant that 
alarm clocks bought cheaply by the distributors some months before 
the price increase were sold at the new~ price t he reby giving tte 
distributors substantial profit. It was held by the Court t ha t 
the confusion that might have ensued on the market had the 
distributors not been pe rmitted to ch~r ge replacement costs against 
the selling price at any one time would not have been in the public 
interest and accordingly the profits were not unreasonably high. 
It is important to note that this Section was tightened latero 
Re gulations made by successive Ministers under the Board of Trade 
Act 1919 were successfully challenged on a numbe r of occasions as 
being ultra vires the Minister. Essentially in Peerless 32~]'_;,: Vo 
Cl in~arb (3) /1953/ N. Z.L.R. 796 it was held that the Act anoiied 
to particular industries and not to New Zealand industries as a whole 
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Accordingly regulations promulgated by the Minister to control 
monopoly broadlY. ~ltra vireso 
"'"'"'-'-' 
In 1956 the Industries and Commerce Act was passed which Act 
re-en~cts the provisions of the Board of Trade Act 1919 but gives 
the Minister wider powers with respect to the combat of monopoly. 
Control of Prices Act 1947 - Offences of hoarding and profiteering 
had added to ~~~ two further offences under ~his xxet • ..ili~·'"Y 
Section 23 of the .~tJrovides that it is an offence to profiteer. 
Section 24 prohibit..;n~arketing and Section 25 prohibited hoarding. 
The l ast offence noted in the Control of Prices Act concerns ~ull 
line forcing 1 o Essentially Section 31 of the Act provides ttat it 
is an offence for a person to insist tha t he will not sell goods to 
a person without that person purchasing additional goodso 
The position by 1958 
Before the Trade Practices Act 1958 was enacted the major control 
of restrictive tr ade practices had been through the creation of 
various statutory offences. It might be convenient at this stage 
to list those offences. They are: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
illegal ccncession in consideration of exclusive 
dealing in commodities; 
illegal r efusing to deal with a person; 
conspira cy to create a monopoly; 
black marketing; 
hoarding; 
profiteer ing; 
full line forcing; 
sales by commercial trusts at unduly profitable 
prices; 
In addition it would appear that two common law -f}±eading sfltl±l 
nc.t be~s tioued~---pe-P--S-()l4 
c,-~,~~" 
:a~ s trai-nti-ve--p-ra-e-t-:i-ees seemed to have escaped the codific a tion of 
criminal law in ~ew Zealand in the late nineteenth century. \~ 
Offences we re marketing of goods by treat and the spreading of 
false rwnours with the intent to enha.nce or decry the price of 
goods. In 184t{'~n glish Statute preserved these offences (which 
were cornm.on law offences) \·Thilst dealing with others. The 
Engli sh Act was adopted by New Zealand by the English Acts Act 1854. 
This Statute was consolidated by the English Laws Act 1908. It 
would appear therefore that Section 9 of the Crimes Act 1961 ddxl not 
applyo 
, __ 
I 
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It is also perhaps worth noting that Section 310 of the Crimes ,\et 
1961 by creating an offence t o conspire to commit an offence under 
any other Act may be a 9p licable to prohibitOJ~ trade practices the 
commission of which is an offence. 
Essentially then by 1958 the control of monopolistic practices w~s 
restricted to the criminal prosecution under fairly limited Sections1 
Trade Practi ces Act 1958 
In September last year the Government substantially amended the 
Trade Practices Act 19580 ~ecause no case has yet to go to the 
Trade Practices Com.rni ssiofi' nthe amendment came into force this paper 
will deal with the amendment separatelyo 
In 1958 the Labour Government passed the Trade Practices Act 1958. 
The nreQ~ble reads: 
1An Act to make provis ion with respect to the prevention of tr ade 
practices deemed contrary to the publi c interest•. 
The Act applies to trade practices both in respect of goods and 
services (Section 2 (2) and Section 39 of the Trade Practices 
Act 1958)0 
As originallyenacted an ad hoe tribunal was created which had as 
its function 
(a) enquiry as to whether trade practices were in the 
public interest; 
(b) power to order the discontinuance,modification . o--v 
prohibition of the repetition of any trade practice 
which was contrary to the public interest; 
(c) power to take any other steps to control practices 
which are or might be contrary to publi c interest; 
(d) power to recommend nrice control and the power to 
exercise the powers-of the Price Tribunal. 
(Section 8 Trade Practices Act 1958)0 
Effectively until the September 1971 Amendments to the Act the 
Trade Practi ces Commission and the Price Tribunal were one .HJ. the 
same body. ,_{ 
As originally enacted and until 1961 the Act provided that all 
agreements relating to the trade practices should be registered. 
This was to facilitate the discovery of trade practices, it being 
somewhat difficult to discover agreements between traders. The 
r -
~. 
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Examiner of Trade Pra ctices even now ccnsiders that many agre ements, 
which would otherwi se be ille ga l trade practices, are made at s uch 
places as golf courses. It is argued when the National Governrnent 
amended the Act in 1961 that the deletion of the registration 
provisions would se riously weaken the Act. It is doubtful whe t he r 
the Act was seriously we akened by the deletion of the provision 
relating to the registration of trade practiceso 
The Examiner acts as a kind of policeman of trade practices. The 
Examiner can examine any practice on receiving a complaint or upon 
his 01.m motion (Section 16) o He was ori ginally de emed a Com.mi t tee 
of Enquiry under t he Industries and Commerce Act 1956 wtich r;ave 
him wide powers to re quire the production of documents and so 0:10 
If the Exaoiner discovered a trade practice which he thou 0 ht 
contrary to the public interest he could require the parties to the 
trade practice to answer any allegations he CTay make of ito In 
other words an op portunity is given the persons carrying on the 
trade practice to desist from their ways (Section 164). 
i\.a Conciliation provisions of Section 16 A were inserted in 1965. 
Essentially the parties to a trade practice agreeffient are given the 
opportunity by the 2xaminer to discuss the agreement with the 
Examiner and if possible settle the differences. 
The Examiner whether or not the matter is settled by conciliation 
is obliged to report the trade practice to the Commission with his 
recommendation as to the course to be followed by the Commission. 
The Commissinn~1here the parties have agreed to desist fro m a 
praqtice1 a discretion to orde
r an enquiry but otherwise~ obliged 
to call an enquiry. (Section 18 of the Trade Practices Act 1958). 
The Commission has wide powers to accept otherwise inadmissable 
evidence, to coerce persons into giving evidence and so forth 
(Section 18). 
Until 1965 the two mostim;)ort::rnt Sections of the Act were ? 
Sections 19 and 20. The first Section gives jurisdictio__u'to the 
Commission to entertain enquiries into spec1.1'ie d tr c1.de pr ac\..ices 
whilst Section 20 provides first that the Corn..-nission has jurisdictio r: 
to make an order if the practice is found to be against the public 
interest but leaves a discretion to the Commission to widely 
consider the circumstances of public interest (AssocL1ted Book 
Sellers case /1962/ N.l.L.R. 1058 and New Zsa land Ba~cer's As s n 
unreported 29 May 1970). 
First the Com:nission has jurisdiction to hold an enquiry into the 
,.. . 
G p 
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trade pro.cticc when the Examiner asserts th:1.t any of the fol lowlne 
fact sltu~tions outlined b2low huve been found . It is imoortant 
to no~G that in the m:ijority of cases (tnirty five been to th3 
Comrnis sion in al 1) the par lies have admitted that the a.gree11en t '.,: as 
a trade practice under on8 of the followin~ heads (Section 19 ( 2 ) ):-
(j) Restriction. o.:' DeJ.lin..,s - Section 19 ( 2 ) (a ) concerns 
a sit· ation where either wholesalers or retai lers combine to restrict 
the rct2.iler:, or wholesalers respectively wi tt whom they deal. 
i~ Agreencnts or /1.rran ~errents Upon the terms of Agreements 
roFurchase Goods or provide services . 
Cl) --1, , 'I A co:nbj_na tion of wholesalers , co mbino. tion of wholesalers 
ret·ilers and contractors as to price and terms of goods and 
services ( Sect ion 19 ( 2 ) (b) ). 
Under Section 19 (2 ) (b) the Commission has considered two cases 
namely the Passenger Conference case 1963 (unreported ), Fencing 
MatcriaJs cas e 1959 (w1reno rted). The latter co..s e concerned o..n 
agreement between a combinat ion of who l esaler s and retailers ~s to 
th e prices t o be charged for wire-netting. The former case 
conc erned an agreement between P~ssen er Shipping Lines as t o the 
terms of appointment of tr avel agents . 
(,·i) Ji'G. A comM.na tion of al l selling par ties as to t he selling 
price (Sec ti on 19 ( 2 ) (c). 
Under~·ection ( 2 ) ( c) the Comrnis sion has heard ~ tr ade 
practices concerning the following:-
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
the fixing of charges for services ( New Zealand 
Banker I s Asso ciation ( 1970 ) (unr eoor ted) · 
ring tende ring - Funeral Director~ (1960 ~ (unrepor t ed) 
glazing contr~cts (1959) (unr Gpo rted); 
fixing of prices for goods (Quarry Owners (1963) 
(unr eported ) Electric Lamps (1961) (unr Gpo rted); 
the giving of pricelists which wer e not necessarily 
bindin ~ on me~bcr - Fencing Agreement (1959 ) 
(unr epor ted) Master Grocers / 1961/ N. Z. L. R. 172 . 
In most cases a tr ade oractice as described in the Act was found; 
fu..~ the Coa";lission did ltl ~{:1t; terto1'} Dread Jo.ker..§. (unreport ed ) 19G3 
consderE":'d tha,l nri ce control vir t1..:.o.ll:;- eli.rr:ina ted I the tr.:..de 
practice ' whereby ba~crs agreed not to cut prices because no 
comr:rf.i tion Wu.s possible in bread because of the very low profit 
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margino 
(i~) Agreement by Wholesalers to sell to Reta ilers if they 
agreed to resell at a wholesaler's stipulated price (Section 19 
(2) (d)o 
The decision of' in re Marketing of Televisi.on Re ceivers and 
Home :1ppliance s ( 1966 ) (unr epo rted) 1,?'rlcovered the agreement by 
television wholesalers to sell to r etailers who had accepted t he 
wholesa lers stipulated prices. 
vv) An agreeoent between a whole_aler and a retailer whereby 
the retailer agreed to resell at a sp ecified price only 
(Section 1 9 (2) (e). 
ttl Grantin,:, of Rebates ( 1)An agr eement by sellers/sellers and 
buyers ti::.3.t r20:::..::. es would be granted to buyers fo r quantity or 
value of goods boughto 
Refusals to sell or dea l 
i. An agreement by sellers not to sell to certain classes of 
buyers and vice versa (0ection 19 (2) (g)o 
ii. An agreement between wholesalers or between retailers 
not to employ labour, machinery, etc (3ection 19 (2) (h) ). 
iii. An unjustifiable refusal by a wholesaler to sell to a 
retailer. l~ 1C'\ c.1 X.\\ 
Although at least one other case under this heading has been before 
the Commi ssion the facts of the two cases cited below are important . 
In the re Kemnthorne Prosser case /1964/ N. Z. ~ .• R. 49 the ComL1ission 
6onsidered the s ituation where C.I. B. A. through its New Zealand 
agent Kemnthorne Prosser (and wholesaler) r efused to sell it s whole 
range of ethical drugs to Sharland & Co. unless that company 
ceased t o manufac ture an ethical drug in New Zealand (which drug 
Sharlands could marke t at a considerably lover cost)o 
In the Animal Remedies case (unr eported ) 5 February 1971, the 
Commission consi ri ered t he refusal by the co~panies manufacturing 
animal remedies to supply certain farmers I co-opera.ti ve societies. 
In both the cases the Appeal Authorit y/Contmis 0 ion decided the 
cases dn the public interest gr ounds contained in Section 200 The 
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later case is however imoortant for the decision seems to have prompted, at least in the-minds of the opposition, the 1971 Amendment Act. --j(_ Agrecnents concerning ~rice control a~ct the Offenq~.[ Thereunder 
io Agreenents by persons to withhold the supply of (-. ,·D goods, alocated territories or markets for the sale of goods. ~ ~~ 
The Waikato Master Builders case (unreported) (1 July 1963) concerned the practice of builders in the Waikato area to alow only the lowest tenderer on the first tender to tender again if tenders were recaled. The lowest tenderer could not tender a price lower than the first lowest tentle-d oriceo +e~-.<'. c"-,etC 
i. Any practice which would constitute offences under Section 23, 24, 25 and 31 of the Price Control Act 1947. ~ ;<1(L-)(~1 li Excessive Com,r,ission -Payment of an excessive contaj_ner royalty etco (Section 19 (2) (m) )o 
Exclusion from Trade Or~anisation -An unjustifable exclusion from a trade associa tiono c.-:) 1q c2 )Cr1). 
The Commission considered such a comnlaint in the Auckland Electric2.l Wholesalers Assn (unreported) 1962 when an association of retailers endeavoured to join a wholesalers association for the purpose of obtaining al the wholesalers' discount"\. They could not get the wholesalers I discounts otherwise. The Cormnission found that no unjustifable refusal had occurred because largely the group seeking admission was a retailers association and not a wholesalers association (Section 19 (2) (n) )o 
Agreements to enforce Trade PrGctices -Any agreement to enface any 1:rade practice above would also be such practice as to give the Commission jurisdiction to make an ordero 
~ Situations Not Covered -The Governor General by order in Council may add to the list above if the Commission recommends s~ch an addition. 
Before dealing with the two major difficulties arising out of the list above it is worth noting tha t an agree~ent by buyers to combine, provided they buy for their own cons~mptionl is not a trade practice under Section 19 (2) ( Section 19 (3)f 
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j;.... Most of the paragraphs dealing with combination of persons for the 
purposes of trade practices the words 'agreement or arraneenent 1 
are foundo fhe Appea l Authority considered how broadly one 
interpreted 'arrange~ent' in Fencing Materials /1960/ N.Z.L.R. 1121, 
and held that an arrangement for the purposes of the let was 
intended to include more than •merely a~ understanding between t~ 
or more persons intended to be observed by the parties thereto but 
not intended to create obligations enforca·.ble by legal proceedings'• 
Judge Dalglish held that where an organisation 'arr 3.nged ' c'-9ractice 1:t; 
+o which practice its members were bound (although not legally) to 
conform w.a:ti, an I arrange!llent 1 1v0uld existo 
An arrangement was also found in the Registered Hairdressers case 
/1961/ N. Z.L.R. 161, because the Association, having power to fix 
charges , did so, a.Rd' even though the 1\.ssociation did not have power 
over its members to enforce the list of prices to be charged. 
In neither case was any atteopt made to 
'arrangement ' but rather by example the 
Authority tended to extend the meaning o 
with respect to Section 108 of th( Land 
of assistance in future cases. 
limit the definition of 
Commission or A-meal 
Accordingly th~ - decisions 
and Income Tax 1954 may be 
The second important word in Section 19 (2) is the word 1 substanti~ 
which occurs in the first part of the Section. The Comrnissj_on has 
jurisdiction to make an order under Section 19 (1) only if the 
practices fall substantially within tte categories listed above. 
The word was considered in a number of cases prior to the 1965 
Amenclment Act but notably in the New ~ealand M:::. ster Grocers 
federation case /1961/ i . Z.L. R. 117. it that time fifty percent 
by way of turnover of the goods sold by grocers were price control 
goods, thirty percent were pri ce maintained goods (the price was 
marked by the manufacturer) and price free goods made up the balance 
of the turnovero The Federation of Grocers sent out lists of all 
the goods whether under price control, whether price maintained 
or whether price control free with suggested prices for the grocers. 
It was found that the Federation promoted the selling by grocers 
of price control goods at the maximum price permitted and did the 
same with price maintained goods. Members of the Federation 
also adhered fairly closely to the suggested prices . In fact on 
price free goods, while a substantial adherence to the suggested 
price occurred'elaborate specialling' and other devices caused some 
items to vary in price from time to time. It thus appeared there 
was a conflict in the terms of the Act because Section 19 (2) (c) 
provided- 1 An agreement ••••. to sell goods only at prices agreed 
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•••••• • whilst the opening words of the Section provided thJ.t the 
Commi sslon to find a trade practice r:iust find that the trade practice 
was substantially within Section 19 (2) (c). In the Master 
Grocers case clearly some dovia tion occurred from thelisted nrices . 
rhis~s argued by Counsel to mean that the practice did not f~ll 
within 0ectior.. 19 (2) (c) for the rocers did not sell oq,_1:.,Z :lt list 
prices . However the A peal Authori ty found there exis t ed 1suGstantiallj,,( 
an agr eement or an arraneement to sell a t listed prices. 
Some argi.;.men t v-ms heard in earlier cases that where an associ:i tion 
merely recommended a price, without binding its members , no trade 
practice under Section 19 (2) could be fo md . (Hoster Grocers 
(supra )1 llegistered Hairdressers (su~r a ), Fencing 1ate rials (1959 unrepor L. ed ) ) o 1h .. , cv~ 1A,1M...--t- (,u°'-"- ~<-k-e(. 
In 1965 the Government uassed legislation to the effect that a 
reco rnrnendo.t ion by a tr ade assocLition to its members on prices would 
be deemed to be a trade practice even if the r e co~nendation was not 
enforcible against the members (Section 19 (7), (8) , (9 ) ). 
The Commission can:iot make an order unde r Se ction 19 (1) ·without 
first finding a trade practice to be substantially in one of the 
ca t egories mentioned in Section 19 ( 2 )o However before the 
Commi ssion can m2..lce an order certain matters under Section 20 of the 
Act must be established . 
Section 20 a-&-±:t ~d before the Trade Practices ~ t .~ et 1971 
r eada as follows :-
1Trade practices deemed contrary to the public interest -
(1) For the purposes of this Act, a trade practice 
shall be deemed contra ry to the public interest 
only if, in theopinion of t he Com~i sion , the 
effect of the practice is or would be -
(a ) to increase unreasonably the costs 
r elating to the production, manufacture , 
transpor t, stor ge , or distribution of 
goods; or 
(b) to increase unreas onably the prices a t which 
goods are sold ; or 
(c) to increase unre ~sonably the profits derived 
from the production, manufacture, 
distribution, transport , storage , or sale of 
goods ; or 
(d) to prevent or unre&sonably reduce or limit 
competition in the production , manufacture, 
supply, tr~nsportation , stor tbe , sale, or 
-· G p 
(e) 
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purchase of any goods; or 
to limit or prevent the supply of goods to 
consumers ••••••••• • 
By far the majority of the case s before the Com~ission have 
turned on que stions relating to Section 20 and public interest. 
A. Onus of Proof 
::.ep+· In ~ cases under sub-section 2 of Section 20 (which sub-section 
is not q~o ted) t he burden of proof falls on the examiner who mus t 
establish if the practice complained of was agains t the putlic 
intere s t. (Fencing :Materials /1961/ :·J.l.L.R. 1121). l-Ioreover the 
nnus was upon the balance of probabilities. 
Clearly however tte failure to c·all evidence by the parties against 
whom the Examiner ~rocesds co~ld be d::.sastrous to thJ.t ~~rtv 's 
case (Aera ted Wate~s (1959 (unreported) ). In that ca~e f;ur of 
the six manufacturers of soft drinks in the dellington agreed to 
meet re gularly to discuss the prices a t wnich soft drinks were sold. 
It asserted at the hearing that there were two manufactUDrs who 
did not participate in the pricing agreement, but}fJ.iled to gtve 
evidence of t he s hare that those manufacturers had of the narket . nS 
Schweppes and Coca Cola were the other two manufacturers it could be 
felt that the manufacturers were careless in not calling the 
evidence. 
B Effect o::' J:.r.actices T nreason:i.ble 
The Examiner has nearly always re l ied on paragraph B,c, and D, 
in Section 20 (l)o 
Paragraphs Band C deal with unreasonable increases in profit 
or prices. First it should be not ed that t he p!'ac tice of mainta.i'1::.ng 
a price is not covered in paragraph B. (In Hormone ~eed Killc~s 
(Appeal Authority) (1965 unreported) con ~ide r able savings had t1en 
achieved by the producers of hormone weed killers by the cut ting of 
production costs which t hereby caused higher pr~fits. An agreement 
between the manufacturers ~ean t no reduction was passed onto the 
consllEler. No evidence was calLid as t o the profits m de on 
Hormone Weed Killers however and the Appeal Authority did not 
therefore consider pa ragraph C of Sectlon 20 ou: held that on 
paragraph D the agreement unreasonably limited conpetition. 
It will be apparent that in paragraphs B, c, and D the legislature 
has been extrenely vague in defining what profit is un.reasonable. 
i 
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Thus in the Hor:none Weed Killer case(Commission unrenorted 1965) 
the Com:nis sion said orofits would have to be 'undue or excessive 1 
~~wti4-eh stated that accurate coQputation could not be made except on 
the individual facts of each caseo 
CiU.C\<A--h ~ ·~ Und er paragraph D some atte r.ip t has been made to qJnnti .a te ~ 
~s what is unreasonable 'reduction of competition'. 
Thus t he £ encing 0a terials case (supra) was roturned by the Appeal 
Authority to thG Corr:ission ·.vith a direction tha t t he Cor;:.."::ission 
conside r whether t he trade practice did in fact unreasonably r educe 
comoeti tiono The Cor.unissi::m in~nreuorted decision found ·~ fact .i.. 
.. c.;-~ < ' that fifty percent of the who lesalers abided by the agreement and 
twenty five percent o~ the retai lers abided by the agreGment . 
The Cor:imission fou.."1d that was .J.n unre2.sonable r eduction in 
co rnnetttion. It made an ordero The Contilission also said that had 
the· figures been forty percent and twenty percent the decisio:ri :,would 
have been the same. Incidentally on the first occas ion upofiithe 
.ttncing :,fa teri a ls case was before the Commission the Commi ssion 
appeared to hold tha t the establ ishnent of the trade practice under 
S~ction 1 9 (2) virtually meant it was requir ed to hold as a matter 
of law t he practi ce reduced or li~ited competitiono 
In the Master Grocers case (supra) orders were made in the case of 
the .Auckland and Canterbury Federat-Lons only which:re·pr~'se'nted 
eighty five percent or more of the grocers in the area o Orders 
were not made in the case of :lelli ngton and Otago where t he grocer 
parties to the agreement were somewhat less than eighty five 
percent. 
Whatever it is obvious that considerable difficulty could arise 
to the Corn::iission if it endeavoured to lay down rules as to what was 
an unreasonable reduction of competition. ThetSeach case must be 
considered on its individual facts. 
c. Unreasonable, a Q~stion of l:_aw or Fact 
It will be apparent from the ab~ve discussion and from the Fencing 
Materials ca~se (Appea l Autho rity) t hat the .• ~peal Authority 
considered reasonableness a question of facto 
D. Relevance of Motive 
The Act prescribes tha t if the 1 effect 1 of the practice was one of 
those found under paragraphs A,B,C,D, and E , in Section 20 then 
the trade practice may be deemed contrary to public interesto 
~-
lll 
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However in two decisions Passenger Conference 1963 Appeal Authority 
and Kempthorne Prosse r /1964/ N. Z.L.R. 49 the question of motive 
was aiscussed. 
In the Passenger Conference case in the first instance the 
Commission found that Br1tish Lines h~d agreed t o endeavour to 
prevent other lines, notably Chandris? from entering t he passenGer 
trade from New Zealand to 3urope. This they held was contrary to 
public interest under paragraph Do::' Section 2<!) (1963 un!'eported 
decision). 
The Appeal Authority allo",,ed the appeal upon the ground that the 
agreement had been ineffectual for t~e Chandris line could obtain 
passengers f airly easily in New Zealand and moreover there was a 
lar ge surplus of passenge r be rths available. Accordingly said the 
Authority no reduction or limitatiun of competi tion had occurred 
as a result of the agreement. he rrotive therefore of the co~ferencf 
was quite irrelevant. 
In the Kempthorne Prosser case (unreported Commission 1963) the 
Commis sion held that the refusal by C.I.B.A. to deal with 
Sharlands was aga _nst the public interest because it reduced 
competition in the drµg industryo The Appeal Authority in a 
decision reported in \_19641.r. Z. L. H. at page 49 found tha t compe t:L tion 
from the point of vi ew of the public had not been limited because 
the C.I.3.A. drugs could as easily be obta ined from other 
wholesalers. IIowever it went on to say that t he Cor:imission would 
not make an order prohibiting the continuance of the trade 
practice 'because it involved some unfairness against a reputable 
trader who is acting in accordance with his rights or because in 
some respect not mentioned in Section 20 the interests of the public 
might be detrimentally effected 1 o 
In other words the petulance of C.I.B.A. and the rather unsporting 
retaliation it took upon discovery tha t Sharlands was undercutting 
it in some drug was not a factor for considera tion by the 
Commission. 
Discret ion of the Commission 
The Appeal Authority held in the Associated Booksellers case 
/1962/ N. -3 .L.R. 1058 tha t the establishrnerfCofatra-de-nractice 
under Section 19 (2) and the finding of an effect under . Section 
20 (1) did not necessar ily mean that an order mus t be m~de in sorne 
way re s tI.'9.i..ning or prohibiting the continua tion of the trade 
practice. They said that while the finding of such factor was 
necessary to enable the Cohl.c~ission to make a decision it still had 
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a discretion under Section 20 to make the ordero Accordingly 
~uch evidence has b8en given in the cases of addi ti onal :·actors 
which have enabl ed the Commission to exercise its discretion and 
finj public interest could be as well served by the cont ~nua tion 
of the trade practice as by t he prohibition of tje continua tion 
thereof. ( See inter a lia ~holesale Beer Pri ces , 1966 (unreyorted ), 
~etail Beer Prices, 1966 (unreporte<fT;1few ~eal and Bankers As~n, 
1970 (unreportedJ o · · 
The Appeal Authority 's reasons revolved entirely upon the 
constructi on of t he words 1a trade practice shall be deemed 
contra ry to the public interes t only if •••••. the effect of the 
pr actice is ••••••• , and in par ticular upon the wor d ' only '. 
On first r ead ing it woul d a ppear tha t t he words 1 shall 1 and 
'deemed I are mandatory. -~owever said the Au -chor i ty the word 
1 only 1 must be given a meaning; deletion of t he word would 
certainly mean that the Co1mnission had no discretion. De.lgli sh J. 
also rejected an a r g~~ent that the word 'only' referred~t~ the 
cases i '1 which the Co r:11:ni s sion had powe r to make an order unon the 
gro :ind that had the le gisl:i ture meant tha t it would have used the 
words 'if but only if'. Accordingly said the Authority the finding 
of a trade practice under Section 19 (2 ) and the proving of one of 
the headings under Se ction 20 while necessary to the making of an 
order did not necessarily ::1.ean t ha t the Commission must make an order. 
Accordingly the Authority said the Cor~tii ssion had a discretion to 
broadly consider the effects of t he trade practiceo 
While the re :i soning adopted by Dalglish J. wa s r a ther tortuous 
it is submitted that the broad int e r pre tati on placed by Dalglish J. 
upon this Section is a ppropriateo 
Public Interest 
No attempt is oade to discuss the meaning of t he words in this 
paper although they are vital to t he Commission 's decisions. Quite 
clear ly in al l of t he cases the Co~~ission has placed its own 
interpretation upon the words ' public interest' and has v~ried 
what it considers to be the publi c interest from time to time . The 
Commission ha s never drawn a rule as t o what is public int erest . 
Collective Tendering 
In 1965 t he legislature prohibited co llective tende ring absolutely anr 
provided that : ubstantial fines were to be imoosed on persons 
bre aching this provision of the Ac t. Essenti~l l y the Act makes it 
an offence for wholesalers, retailers, or contrac tors to ag r ee to 
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tender at prices and upon conditi ons agreed between t he p~rties . 
Similarly if parties agree for all or any of the~ not to tende r 
t hen an offence is comr.litted (Section 23 A Trade Pr a cti ces Act 
1958) 0 
Se c tion 23 B c oncerns auctions and persons agreeing as to the 
prices t hey will bid . Legislature has pur ported to ban absolutely 
such practices a s well o 
It will be apparent that the most importa::1.t wordsin section 23 A 
are the words 'to tender 1 o It will be apparent that the words 
have a very limited meaning. It is arguable tha t 'tender ' covers 
stric tly the situation wi1 ere tenders are re quested, as for example 
by the Government Stores 3oard for various package re ~uirements 
...iJ.:: be-s . ~'/he r e howeve r a pe rson requi res a quotatL:m f or a packaglng 
Job it i s arguable no tender is given by the packagers . In t! e one 
prosecution recently Mr HcLeavy S. 1-1 . held in an unreported 1970 
decisi on that the true tender was a tender for the purposes of the 
Act and that all other cases i nvolving ' quo tation' were exactly 
the same. The de cision is f a r fro~ satisfactory for i t had been 
conceded by Counsel that a 'true ' t ender was covered by the Act and 
the quote situation was no to The Magistrate considered only the 
true tender ~t depth and asse rted ~erely in one sentence ~hit the 
'quote' situa tions we re exactly the same. The cas e is Department 
of Industries and Comme rce v. A.H.I. and U. E.B. and Others. 
It is not proposed to deal further ~n th t he Trade ?ractices :et 
1958 except when consi de ring the effects of the 1971 AmendJ;J.ent Act. 
Before dealing with t he amendments some brief menti on ought to be 
made of the last two decisions of the Com:nission, name ly t he Bank 
Charge s case and the Anima l Remedies case o 
It wil lbe well kn::>wn that t he Banks uniforrn~ly and in collusion 
co~pletely altered t he systems for charging current accounts in 
1969. The old Inland H-evs~e Jxchange was known to be ineq'J.itable 
and was causin? the Banks some s erious lo s ses. The ~xmniner suent ~ -some considerable ti~e building a ca:e agatns t the Ban~s and brought 
his ca se against them relying on Section 20 (d). It was held 
basically that the Bank competed in other ways than in the p~ ice of 
t heir acc8unts and that no reduction or li~itation of connetiti on 
had occurred o rio reover it was felt tha t t:1.e 3ants we re under the 
CA-.L1t 
control of the Reserve Bank wi-t'n consi de r able r estraint o.n. (h,~ h-
Government monetary policy . (..,,,_,"" ~"~- ' ' 
-· G 
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The Ani~al Remedies case concerned the refus a l by animal remedy manufacture rs t o deal with certain co-ooeratives. These 
co-operatives h~d been formed by farmer~ for the purpose of obtaining wholesale prices for many of their req~irements. Some 
13,000 farmers were members out of nearly 60,000 far~ers in 
New Zealand . All far5ers had access to the re~edies through stock and statio~ agents and through certJin long es t ablished 
co-opera. tives i.e. the Farmers' Co-o pe r a tive, and more particul3.rly through vetennary clubs (40,000 members). 
Two questions ca~e be fore the Commission, first the question of whether t he re had been an unjustifable refusal to sell or supply under Section 19 (2) (i) and secondly whether Section 20 (Li) applied. On the evidence before it t he Commissicnj isposed to ~old ~\ that the refusal heM~to t he co-operatives was not proved to be unjustified. It said 110 1.,ever. ,th.J. t it !1.eed 1;.ot decide t:-_e point for ir_L2 its opinion paragraph et\ of Section 20 ( 1) was t he strongest basis 1:n,f" its decisj_ on. The Comniss ion found as a f act tha t a large nwn::ier of al terna ti ve outlets already existed fro:n '.vhich the farmer could as conveniently obtain the drenches .:-Z.n~ "o ~<tl<<-ho.-.. o( CL> w\A()->~\\h~ ~ DCC. u Yr<-€( tvf +-
These cases are important for clearly in the mind of tte op?osition rt ~- not t he Government t hey prompted a review of tte Tr.J.dePracti-ces Act 1958 and as a cor..sequence the 1971 Amendment Act followed. Certainly it apoears to be the view of some ~e~be rs that both - \C{:, ,:;.., cases were decided the wrong way and tha t th e ~tatute wa s not strong enough. (See Debates on Tr ade Practices Bill Hansard 1971 at 2664 and 2697 and 2720 and 2744, and in particularly spe e ches by 
Messrs Colman and Connelly at pages 2736, 2738 and 2739 and 2740)0 .Amendment 
Trade Practices/Act 1971 
The Trade Practices Amendoent Act 1971 now nrovides for the splitting of t he ?rice Trihunal and the Tr2.de Practices Comi.11ission . In vie·", n.("' t.t.e :.et"-the Comm:Lssion .:nay no w r eque st t:-_e Price Tribunal to make inve::;tigations if it seems desirable. ~41"-...,t=;:v.:e=· 1· it would appear that certa in informa tion co uld co~e to the ?rice Tribunal which would not usua lly go to the Tra.de Practices Co m.:.i i ssi. on which inf ormation could te prejudicial to the parties appearing before the Trade Practices Commission. 
Section 5 of the A.:nendment ,-1.ct Drovides tha t the Exar!liner, when in doubt as to whether a tr ade :i r actice is contr a ry to nublic ir.terest can refe r the matter to the tommission for enquiry. ·Previously the Examiner had to be satisfied tha t a trade practice was contrary to public interest befo r e referrir. 5 the ma tter to the Commission. This provisions leaves t he Examiner conside r &bly more scope to 
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introduce cas es to the Commission and may indeed allow the 
Commis sion to get more cases before it. Eoweve r it should be 
remembered that case s involving tade prac tices very often 
are extremely expens ive and long drawn out 3.ffairs . It would 
appear that parties to tade practices could well be p-qt to 
consid erable apense in justifying the tr ade :9r act ice f~ the 
Examiner, being in doubt as to the public interest question , 
puts a case before the CoEuniss ion which should not otherwi se go 
to the Comnission. 
A new jection 18 A of the Act applies to tr ade practices under 
Section 19 (2) (b) (c) and (d) of the principal Act. It does not 
apply to situations where a r esale maintenance agreement is 
re a ched between a single wholesale r and a single r e t aile ro 
(Presumably this latter type of agreement is no t disapproved) 
Horeover it does not app ly to those trade practices which--are made 
offences by the 1965 Aiendxent Act (Section 23 A and Section 23 B 
of the principal Act) or to any tr ade prac~ce specifically 
authorised by any other enactment. For the purposes of Section 18 A 
recowGendations made by tr~de associations.notwithstanding the fact 
that t he reco ~~endati ons include a direction that the reco mmendation! 
are not binding on the members of the association.are de emed to be 
trade practices to which Section 18 A now applies. Section 18 A (3) 
provides that persons indulging on the tr ade practices mentioned 
above must seek the approval of the ~§~~ission to the practice. 
Essentially provided the practice is; ontrary to Section 20 of the 
principal Act asamended the Commis sion ma/ approve the practice 
upon such conditi ons as it thinks fit. Over t hree hundred 
applica tions had been received by the Examiner~ the beginning of 
September 1972. All of the provisions concern~ investigation 
conciliation and so forth apply to this Section.~ The Section also 
provides that practices'approved' because no order had been made 
by the Commission upon investigation on a previous occasion are 
deemed to be approved under Jection 18 A. , 
Q.\\0--.:;,4 
A new Section 18 B is inserted into the .~et i~j_ng the Com:nission 
upon the re quest of the Examiner to order parties who might be 
particip 1ting in a tr ade practice to furnish particulars to t he 
Examiner of the tr ade practice. The Examiner of course must have 
reasonable groundSto beli eve tha t there is a tr 2.de practice. The 
parties may oppose the Examiner's application that they notify him 
of the practice. 
Section 8 of the Amendment Act provides tha t the Co~mission can orce; 
parties to revert to the trading conditions in force prior to the 
time when the parties entered into the trade practice. This Section 
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could provide qui te a serious penalty for persons indulging in 
unfair tr ade practices. 
Section 9 of the Act appears to have been enacted as a result 
of the Animal Remedies case . Section 19 (1) (i) of the nrincioal 
Act is ·now amended in order to define an unjustiable ref.1sal to 
sell. An unjustifable refusal now includes the situation where 
goods are offered by a ·wholesaler to a retailer at such disadvantag-
eous ter~s a s to discourage t te retailer from buying from the 
wholesaler or where t he wholesa ler ref uses to de a l with the retailer 
on the same terms as he deals with other retailerso 
Section 10 makes some substantial amendments to Section 20 of the 
principal Act. 
Thus the situation in t he ~or~one ~~ ed Killerr case (supra) where 
prices were not reduced although co sts had been reduced may now be 
subject to Section 20 of the Act. A trade practice may be deemed 
toP~ontra ry to the public interest if the practice hinders reducti ons 
in price to retailers. A provision is made tha t retail price 
maintenance agreements between a wholesaler and retailer will not be 
subject to the new Jection 20 (1) (bb). 
The initial amendoent proposed to Section 20 (1) (d) intended to 
cast the onus of proving that a trade practice was not contrary to 
public interest onto the par ties apparently so pr acticing. However 
after much opposition at the Select Conoittee hearings the Section 
was enacted in its new form which deem~s 'free and unrestricted 
competition to be desirable'. Essentially the persons observing the 
trade praijtice must now establish the trade pra.ctice is more 
desirable~Jts free and unrestrictive competition in the public 
interest. 
This is a quite significant amend~erit for it would appear possible 
that the Commission could have found in the New Zealand Banker 's 
Association case th2.t it was bound to find that price competition 
was desirable in the public interest. 
The Commissi.on in considering the quest ion of unreasonableness of 
profits and prices is now emoowered to refer the whole matter to 
the Price Tribunal for its investiga tion. ( Section 20 (3) ). 
The Comnission is now directed in specific terms as to t he methods 
by which reduction in competition is measured. It must now have 
regard to the total demand for goods or the tota l potential demand 
for goods and t..en have r egard to that portion of the total deoand 
-· G 
fl 
- 25 -
(or total potential demand) over whi ch the reduction in competition 
is likely to occur. Thus for example in the ~nim~t nemed~c~ ~ase 
the denand would be measured by the f~ct th~t twenty pe rcent of the 
total us ers of the product were in the co-operatives . It is 
suggested that in that case the Commission did not c onside r the 
denand but r ~ther considered the numbers of suppliers and 
the new sub-section 4 to Section 20 impliedly overrules the 
decision. 
Section 11 of the Amendment Act provide~~Mf~P, definition of 
'tenders' and in effect consolidates , ~~ C9in~ said, i mpliedly , 
in the A~H.I., U. E. B. case (supra ). Obviously a •quote' given after 
consultation with compe titors is now covered by Sec tion 23 A of the 
principal Act and such a practice could le ad to prosecution and 
conviction. 
Section 12 provides tha t unless approval is given to the 
cotlective pricing arrangenents by the Co mmission an offence will 
have been committed. The Section nrovides for certain 
professional pe rsons to be exempted from the effe ct of t ~is Section 
but not from the effect of any other Section in the Act. 
Section 13 provides that greater penalties can be imposed for 
offences under t he Act. 
Conclusion 
It is submitted tha t Government adopts in t his country a somewhat 
ambivalent and cava ... -lier attitude towards competition. Thus 
the Trade Practices Act and in particular the amendments to the 
Act reflect an increasingly hard line by Government towards the 
absence of competition. 
However Government annears to restrict competition by the 
imposition of price control on a large number of items. 
Gover nment removes competition through various restrictive 
legislation concerning inter alia overseas conpanies, import 
licensing, t ariffs and such similar legislation. 
It would also appear that where the Government itself is in the 
market place it emascul~tes any othe r compe tition by r estrictive 
legislation. The best exanple of this is t he methpds the 
Government has adopted to restrict cor:pe tition for the railways 
by legislation against road and sea tr anspo rt. 
It can be said it is submitted with some force that the Gover~~ent 
is interested in the 'stimulation and encouragement of competition' 
-· ~ 
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(Hon. Shelton in debate in ?arliament September 1971) when it 
suits ito 
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